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The Proposed Damages Directive:  
The Real Lessons from the United States 
 
Robert H. Lande1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Europeans should be doubly cautious when they study the U.S. experience with private 
antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, there are ten specific lessons they can learn. None, however, 
is consistent with the conventional wisdom in the international competition community that 
U.S.-style private enforcement has been a disaster.2 Each should help Europe objectively consider 
the Commission's proposed Directive concerning private enforcement of Competition Law.3 
I I .  TWO IMPORTANT REASONS FOR CAUTION 
Europeans should not trust anyone from the United States who gives advice on the 
subject of private enforcement of competition law without carefully and skeptically considering 
the source. When someone says, "I'm from the U.S. and I'm here to help you," remember that 
everyone has a bias and an agenda. All of my assertions should be discounted accordingly4 and 
heavily in light of the following more general caution: 
                                                      
1 Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, and a Director of the American Antitrust 
Institute. I would like to thank Neil Averitt, John Connor, Joshua Davis, and Albert Foer for valuable comments, and 
Timothy Hart for excellent research assistance. A version of this article will appear in SHAPING PRIVATE ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT IN EUROPE (Mel Marquis & Giorgio Monti, eds. forthcoming). 
2 Although not saying he agreed with it, former FTC Chair William Kovacic succinctly summarized the 
conventional wisdom as follows: "private rights of actions U.S. style are poison."  See FTC:WATCH No. 708, FTC 
WATCH 4 (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.ftcwatch.com/series/708/ (quoting William E. Kovacic speaking at an 
American Bar Association panel on Exemptions and Immunities). For an extensive compilation of additional 
criticisms of U.S. private cases see Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV 1269, 1269-70, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=2132981&download=yes [hereafter "Toward Assessment"]. 
3 When some critics suggest the proposed Directive will move Europe closer towards a U.S.-style of private 
antitrust enforcement, they speak in almost apocalyptic terms. Because an extremely negative view of U.S. private 
enforcement is the accepted wisdom in the international competition community, proponents of expanded private 
rights in Europe are forced to go to great lengths to demonstrate they are not proposing a U.S.-style system. In fact, 
critics of private enforcement tend to make two (largely inconsistent) claims: that it does too little—it fails to provide 
meaningful recovery to victims—and that it does too much—it forces defendants to settle even groundless claims.  
Neither assertion has empirical support. For an extended analysis of these issues see Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. 
Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case For Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GEORGIA L. REV. 1, 17 (2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=2217051 [hereafter "Defying Conventional 
Wisdom"]. 
4 In the interest of full disclosure, my own background includes employment as an enforcer at the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission, as a lawyer at Jones Day where I represented defendants more often than I represented 
plaintiffs, and as a professor. I also have worked as a consultant to law firms from time to time and am a co-founding 
Director of the American Antitrust Institute. 
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Don't trust anyone giving advice about private enforcement policy unless his or her 
recommendations are based upon reliable empirical evidence. This especially includes the 
conventional wisdom that private antitrust enforcement in the United States has been a mistake 
Europe should avoid. A careful examination of the underpinnings of this criticism actually 
demonstrates that this consensus is not based upon reliable evidence.5 Rather, this conclusion 
derives only from opinions, anecdotes, and hypotheticals.6  
It is essential, moreover, that you do not require proponents of private enforcement to 
persuade you beyond a reasonable doubt that the critics' opinions are wrong. Rather, a proper 
assessment should begin from a position of neutrality, and the proper analysis and resolution of 
the issues should involve neutrally weighing which side has presented better evidence supporting 
their assertions.7 
I I I .  TEN SPECIFIC LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES 
There is a significant amount of empirical evidence concerning the U.S. experience with 
private enforcement that can be useful for Europeans considering expanding private rights of 
action. The following lessons are based upon evidence that, while not perfect, is the best that is 




                                                      
5 See Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 3, at 3-8. 
6 As you scrutinize the conclusions of critics of U.S. private enforcement please do so with skepticism because: 
1. Critics' hypotheticals or anecdotes do not count as reliable empirical evidence. Almost everything 
involving private enforcement—good and bad—has happened on occasion. The crucial issue for policy 
purposes is how often or how frequently they occur. When a critic asserts that something has happened a 
couple of times this is not proof that it is a typical or common outcome. It may well be anomalous. 
2. An anecdote should count even less when it involves the person alleging it because these anecdotes might 
be self-serving.  Often, a defense lawyer will recount a private litigation horror story without any 
opportunity being given for a response from other side. Please insist on listening to all sides before you 
reach a judgment.  
3. A lawyer giving advice based upon their 30 years of experience, especially 30 years mostly spent doing 
defense work, is not presenting neutral evidence. We're all advocates and effective advocates first convince 
themselves that their positions are correct. Although every one of us believes we're neutral, it's very 
difficult to be neutral after you've spent most of a 30-year career representing one side of a controversy.  
4. The older the evidence, the more it should be discounted. Private enforcement in the United States today is 
very different from the cases that were brought a generation or two ago. Many of the older private cases 
were substantively weak or resulted in questionable relief. Further, some longstanding critics of U.S. 
private enforcement formed their initial views when they were young, and it can be difficult for anyone to 
change their first impression, despite the changes in the field that have arisen during the last 30 years.    
7 Beware of critics giving advice that explicitly or implicitly places the burden of persuasion on the other side.  
In the foggy world of competition policy, whichever side has the burden of proof will be at a significant 
disadvantage.  Some critics of U.S. private enforcement say in effect, "Here's what I believe, and although I don't have 
any empirical evidence for my positions you can trust me because it's based upon my 30 years of experience. Make 
the other side prove beyond a reasonable doubt that my assertions are false." This is especially unfair if the critics 
offer only hypotheticals or self-serving anecdotes to support their views. 
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A. Private Enforcement Has Provided Substantial Compensation to U.S. 
Victims of Anticompetit ive Activity 
This fundamental point often gets lost during the heated and wide-ranging debates. It is 
so significant that it warrants being placed as the first substantive lesson for the European Union. 
Professor Joshua Davis and I recently studied 60 large and relatively recent private U.S. 
antitrust cases. 8  These cases returned a total of $33.8-$35.8 billion in cash to victims of 
anticompetitive behavior.9 These figures do not include products, discounts, coupons, or the 
value of injunctive relief or precedent—only cash. Consequently, these totals significantly 
understate the actual benefits to the victims.10 And, of course, we studied only 60 cases (albeit 60 
of the largest private U.S. cases) out of the many hundreds of private cases filed in the United 
States in recent years. 
The proposed Directive has as its primary goal to compensate European victims of 
anticompetitive behavior.11 The U.S. experience shows that private enforcement has the potential 
to do this. Moreover, there is no other practical way to achieve this goal. 
B. The Assertion that Remedies Secured by Private Cases Usually are 
Valueless is Contradicted by the Empirical Evidence 
Critics of U.S. private antitrust actions frequently assert that the remedies typically 
secured by U.S. private actions are at best dubious and often are completely worthless. Their 
contention is that the most common remedies consist solely of worthless coupons, meaningless 
discounts, and obsolete products, or cash recoveries that were subsequently consumed by private 
attorney fees and claims administration expenses. According to many critics, the only ones to 
benefit from private enforcement are attorneys.12  
None of the critics who make these charges, however, offer evidence beyond opinions, 
hypotheticals, and occasional anecdotes.13 Indeed, for the 60 cases Professor Davis and I recently 
studied, our best estimate (based on empirical evidence) is that, overall, only 20 percent of the 
                                                      
8 For an analysis of these 60 cases see Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 3.  
9 Id. at 17.  
10 Id. at 16. For a large number of methodological issues and caveats associated with this study see Id. and 
Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U. 
SAN FRANCISCO L. REV 879, 889-91, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=1090661 
[hereafter “Benefits”]. As an example of the complications involved, we counted multiple cases involving the same or 
closely related cartels as a single case. Thus, even though a huge number of private cases were filed against the 
international vitamins cartel (and this "cartel," moreover, easily could be considered to be multiple cartels) we 
counted all these cases as one. 
11 See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under National Law for infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the 
European Union, at 30-31, COM (2013) 404 (Oct. 6, 2013). 
12 Of course, the private lawyers deserve compensation. This is especially true because plaintiff attorneys bear 
the risk of no recovery, cost of lost time, and usually discovery expenses as well. 
13 For example, Professor Daniel Crane asserted that “issuing [class members] a check is often so expensive that 
administrative costs swallow the entire recovery.” Daniel Crane, Optimizing Private Enforcement, 63 VANDERBILT L. 
REV. 675, 683 (2010). To support his statement, Professor Crane cited a 41 year-old article by Judge Posner that 
made a similar claim but contained no empirical support. See Toward Assessment, supra note 2, at 1305 (discussing 
the lack of foundation for Professor Crane’s assertion). 
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recoveries went for attorney fees and claims administration expenses.14 The rest was returned to 
the victims. 
Nor have the critics who claim that private U.S. antitrust cases typically have returned 
only worthless coupons, meaningless discounts, or obsolete products to victims ever supported 
their conclusions with systematic evidence. They give opinions, make assertions, and provide 
anecdotes and hypotheticals. They also sometimes  examine what happened in other areas of law 
and simply assert that these outcomes also occur as a consequence of contemporary U.S. private 
antitrust cases.15 But they never offer systematic evidence from antitrust cases to support their 
opinions. (Interestingly, only one of the cases Professor Davis and I examined involved a coupon 
remedy—the Auction Houses cases. However, those coupons were fully redeemable for cash if 
they were not used for 5 years and, again, we did not take the coupons into account in assessing 
the benefits of the litigation; we considered only the cash recovery.)16 
Abuses naturally occur from time to time in private antitrust cases, as they do almost 
everywhere in the legal system. However, a majority of the most egregious examples are from 
other areas of law or are quite old. No one has ever presented reliable evidence showing that 
examples are common today or typical of contemporary private antitrust cases brought in the 
United States. 
C. Most Successful U.S. Cases are Likely to Have Involved Anticompetit ive 
Conduct 
Almost every U.S. private case that results in a remedy does so through a settlement,17 so 
their underlying merits have not been definitively reviewed by a judge. Critics often use the fact 
that most of these cases settled to assert that they were meritless. They sometimes claim that U.S. 
plaintiffs often receive huge sums from meritless cases and that private antitrust actions often 
amount to blackmail or extortion.18 
Since almost anything can happen, there is no doubt that some U.S. settlements did not 
involve anticompetitive conduct, and because almost all of the cases Professor Davis and I 
studied settled, one reasonably might ask whether they involved anticompetitive conduct. Of 
course, opinions about specific cases will vary, and very few conclusions can fairly be made about 
the merits of settlements. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think the cases we studied involved legitimate 
claims. The same underlying conduct supporting the settlements gave rise to criminal penalties 
in 17 of the 60 cases; to civil relief by the government in 17 cases; to a trial that defendants lost in 
15 cases; and to plaintiffs surviving or prevailing at summary judgment or judgment as a matter 
of law in 14 cases.19 Overall, 88 percent of the cases exhibited at least one form of validation as to 
                                                      
14 See Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 3, at 46-48. 
15 Id. For a summary of additional criticisms of private antitrust enforcement, see Benefits, supra note 10, at 
884–89. 
16 Id. at 901 n. 81. To be conservative, however, we did not count these coupons in our cash totals. 
17 See, for example, Toward Assessment, supra note 2, passim. 
18 See Benefits, supra note 10, at 884-88. 
19 Some cases have more than one indicia of merit. See Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 3, at 18-19. 
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their merits.20 (Only 7 of 60 cases did not have at least one of these indicia of validation; these 7 
cases settled too early for a substantive evaluation of their merits).21 
Although this does not prove that these cases involved anticompetitive conduct, to be fair 
one should compare these indicia of validity to the evidence underlying critics' charges that these 
and other cases constituted meritless, legalized blackmail. What evidence do critics provide to 
back up their assertions? Essentially…they offer nothing. Only anecdotes, hypotheticals, and 
opinions—no studies, statistics, or reliable evidence. There is no indication that any of the cases 
Professor Davis and I studied lacked merit, except of course for the self-serving assertions of the 
defendants involved. It is ironic that the conventional wisdom about the lack of merit of U.S. 
private antitrust enforcement itself lacks merit. 
D. Most Large U.S. Private Recoveries are Opt-Out Class Action Contingent 
Fee Cases 
 Of the 60 large private U.S. cases Professor Davis and I studied, 47 were opt-out22 class 
action suits brought by attorneys who were working for a contingency fee.23  These cases 
recovered approximately two-thirds of the $33.8-$35.8 billion recovered by private antitrust 
plaintiffs in our study.24 
Even though some European nations allow opt-out class action cases,25 the European 
Union only permits opt-in class action cases,26 and these cases typically recover damages for only 
a tiny percentage of victims.27 Nor does the European Union allow lawyers to receive contingency 
fees,28 and this limitation severely restricts the ability of most consumer-plaintiffs to recover. 
Although some business victims will be able to sue successfully if the proposed Directive is 
enacted, the vast majority of consumer-victims and small business-victims will continue to be 
uncompensated. 
The 60 cases Professor Davis and I studied were among the largest private actions ever 
brought in the United States and therefore might not be representative of either U.S. private cases 
as a whole or the majority of cases likely to be filed in Europe under the proposed Directive. 
Nevertheless, the European lack of opt-out class action cases and contingent fee arrangements 
suggests that even if the proposed Directive is enacted, most European victims of anticompetitive 
behavior will remain uncompensated. 
 
                                                      
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 "Opt-out" cases can include every class member unless they decide not to participate in the class. 
23 See Toward Assessment, supra note 2, at 1286-87. 
24 Id. at 1287. 
25 See ALBERT A. FOER & JONATHAN W. CUNEO, THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF 
COMPETITION LAW 277-414 (Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo, eds. 2010). 
26 See proposed Directive at Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for 
injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60, 64 (EU). 
27 See Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo, supra note 24, at 296-315. 
28 Id. 
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E. Indirect Purchasers Usually Recover Much Less than Direct Purchasers 
In the United States, there were almost always extra proof problems and other 
complications involving indirect purchaser cases.29 These issues have tended to make indirect 
purchaser recoveries much smaller than those in direct purchaser cases.30 For example, of the 60 
large cases Professor Davis and I studied, only 11 involved indirect purchasers, and the indirect 
purchasers recovered only $2.2 billion, compared to the recovery of $13.1-$14.6 billion by direct 
purchasers in those 44 cases.31 
Apparently, in Europe there are unclear standards involving such direct/indirect 
purchaser issues as the pass-on defense.32 Nevertheless, if the U.S. experience is a guide, the 
relatively modest payments that will be made to indirect victims won't cause the sum of 
payments to direct and indirect purchasers to exceed 100 percent of the overcharges. 
F. Victims in the United States Rarely Were Overcompensated 
Even though U.S. law theoretically awards "treble damages," U.S. victims rarely have been 
overcompensated. Taking the actual U.S. experience into account, there is no reason to expect 
that overcompensation will be a problem in Europe. 
This, of course, means that defendants rarely will pay more than the inflated profits they 
obtained through anticompetitive conduct.33 This is so, despite the possibility victims will receive 
seemingly "duplicative" recoveries under the laws of E.U. Member States in addition to facing 
liability to both direct and indirect purchasers. 
The U.S. antitrust laws theoretically award "treble damages" plus attorney fees to 
successful plaintiffs. 34  However, almost every successful U.S. case settles, and the median 
settlement was less than 50 percent of single damages.35 Thus, even though the $33.8-$35.8 
                                                      
29 See Robert H. Lande, New Options for State Indirect Purchaser Legislation: Protecting the Real Victims of 
Antitrust Violations, 61 ALABAMA L. REV. 447, 456 (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1267202. 
30 In addition, many states do not allow indirect purchaser suits. 
31 See Towards Assessment, supra note 2, at 1286. 
32 See proposed Directive, supra note 11, at 17-18. 
33 However, under the standard optimal deterrence model, defendants should pay more than their illegal gains 
because the probability that their activity will be discovered and sanctioned is less than 100 percent. See John M. 
Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 431-35 
(2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=1917657&download=yes [hereinafter 
“Cartels as a Business Strategy”].    
34 See 15 U.S.C. Section 15(a)(i) (2000).  
35 Defendants should not be expected to settle for their maximum possible exposure. Indeed, for a variety of 
complex reasons even settlements as high as single damages are unusual. Professor John Connor and I are studying a 
group of 66 cartel cases where a neutral scholar calculated the cartel's overcharges in the U.S. market. We compared 
these results to the damages secured in private antitrust cases filed against these cartels in the United States. Despite 
the entitlement to treble damages, our tentative findings are that the victims of only 14 cartels received more than 
100% of their damages. The rest—52 cases—yielded less than actual damages. In fact, half settled for less than 50 
percent of actual damages and the median of the settlements was only 45 percent of single damages. These figures 
are preliminary and are subject to a large number of caveats. They also omit consideration of the value of products, 
coupons, and discounts. For these reasons the actual median settlement could be greater—perhaps as high as 75 
percent of single damages. 
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billion Professor Davis and I calculated as being returned to victims in recent U.S. cases is a lot of 
money, it probably was not nearly enough to fully compensate all the victims in these cases.36  
By contrast, the proposed Directive provides for single damages, defined to include pre-
judgment interest and lost profit.37 Pre-judgment interest and lost profit are not features found in 
U.S. antitrust, and they often can be quite significant. Nevertheless, as noted above, the U.S. 
"treble damages" remedy usually yields settlements of less than 50 percent of actual damages. If 
this ratio were to apply to European private cases under the proposed Directive, European 
victims would be expected to recover on average significantly less than 50 percent of actual 
damages. Even in the cases where some victims additionally recover under the laws of individual 
European nations, their total compensation is likely to be far less than the actual harm they 
suffered. 
Moreover, if the proposed Directive is enacted, there are at least two additional important 
reasons why most victims will continue to be uncompensated. First, recall that most large private 
U.S. antitrust recoveries are opt-out class action cases. By contrast, the proposed Directive allows 
only opt-in class action cases, which typically recover far less. Second, most private U.S. 
recoveries come in contingent fee cases. These are rarely if ever permitted in Europe, even 
though without them, consumers and small businesses seldom will be able to bring competition 
cases. 
For the above reasons, the proposed Directive is unlikely to come close to achieving its 
goal of fully compensating European victims of anticompetitive behavior, and European victims 
will rarely be overcompensated. 
G. The U.S. Private Cases Have Helped Deter Anticompetit ive Conduct 
Significantly 
The purpose of the proposed Directive is, of course, to compensate victims of 
anticompetitive behavior.38 Cases arising under the Directive also will help deter anticompetitive 
conduct, and this should be considered a welcomed side-benefit. 
Deterrence of anticompetitive behavior is often believed to be the concern only of 
government enforcement. Nevertheless, a study I performed with Professor Davis shows that 
private enforcement in the United States likely deters a substantial amount of anticompetitive 
activity. In fact, it probably deters more anticompetitive behavior than even the highly acclaimed 
anti-cartel program of the U.S. Department of Justice.39 This is true even though the Antitrust 
Division’s cases often result in prison sentences for cartel participants!40 We hope that this 
                                                      
36 This is especially likely to be true because roughly 20 percent of the U.S. recoveries were consumed by the 
victims' attorneys' fees and claims administration expenses. See Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 3, at 46-
47. 
37 See proposed Directive, supra note 11, at 2. 
38 See id. at 4. 
39 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence From Private Enforcement and Criminal 
Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV. L. REV. 315, 317 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=1565693. 
40 We use $6 million as having approximately the equivalent deterrent effect of a year in prison. Id. 
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finding will cause many in both the United States and in Europe to reevaluate their views as to 
the overall efficacy of private antitrust enforcement. 
Of course, recent fines for violations of competition law have been much higher in 
Europe than in the United States. In 2013 the total U.S. antitrust fines were $1.88 billion,41 while 
for the European Union they were $2.50 billion.42 Similarly, for the last five years the United 
States and European Union total fines were, respectively, $4.19 billion43 and $11.92 billion44 and 
for the last ten years the totals were, respectively, $6.74 billion45 and $23.21 billion. 46 As 
impressive as these European totals have been, however, they are smaller than the recoveries in 
just the 60 private U.S. cases that Professor Davis and I studied. Surely in Europe—like in the 
United States—private actions have the potential to significantly deter anticompetitive conduct. 
The proposed Directive's private actions are not likely to have such dramatic deterrence 
effects for the reasons given in Section F, supra. Nevertheless, the Directive’s deterrence effects 
have the potential to be important. These should be considered a welcomed side-benefit of the 
Directive, especially because these cases will cost European governments and taxpayers very little 
in enforcement costs. 
H. Despite the Combination of U.S. Private Actions and Government 
Enforcement, There Has Been No Evidence of Over-deterrence 
If the proposed Directive is enacted, firms might well pay both a fine to the European 
Union and damages in private cases. The U.S. experience strongly suggests, however, that this 
combination will not result in over-deterrence. 
A recent study I co-authored with Professor John Connor analyzed the optimal 
deterrence issue in the cartel context. We analyzed whether existing U.S. cartel sanctions are 
optimal in achieving deterrence.47 
The United States imposes a diverse array of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines 
and restitution payments for firms in addition to prison, house arrest, and fines for corporate 
officials. Both direct and indirect victims can sue for mandatory treble damages and attorney's 
                                                      
41 See Melissa Lipman, EU eclipses DOJ with 2.5B in antitrust fines in 2013, Law360.com (January 8, 2014 
7:02PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/499516/eu-eclipses-doj-with-2-5b-in-antitrust-fines-in-2013. 
42 Id. at 1. 
43 See Toward Assessment, supra note 2, at 1329-30, app. Tbl. 13,14 (2013), (for years 2003-2011); Department 
of Justice, Antitrust Division, Division Update Spring 2013, (last visited January 10, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2013/criminal-program.html (for year 2012); Lipman, supra note 
40, at 1 (for year 2013). 
44 See id. (for year 2013); European Commission, Competition: Cartel statistics, 1 (Dec. 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf.l (for year 2012); Slaughter & May, The EU 
Competition Rules on Cartels, app. 1 at 26 (May 2012), available at 
http://files.teneoevents.eu/media/emailings/pdf/the-eu-competition-rules-on-cartels.pdf (for years 2003-2011). 
45 See Toward Assessment, supra note 2, at 1329-30, app. Tbl. 13,14 (2013), (for years 2003-2011); Department 
of Justice, supra note 42 (for year 2012); Lipman, supra note 40, at 1 (for year 2013). 
46 See Lipman, supra note 40, at 1 (for year 2013); European Commission, supra note 43 (for year 2009-2012); 
Slaughter & May, supra note 43, at 26 (for years 2003-2009). 
47 See Cartels as a Business Strategy, supra note 32.  
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fees.48 The multiplicity of sanctions has helped give rise to the strongly held—but until recently 
never seriously examined—conventional wisdom in the antitrust field that these sanctions are 
not just adequate, but they are likely excessive. 
We analyzed the issue using the standard optimal deterrence approach.49 The model is 
predicated upon the belief that corporations and/or individuals contemplating illegal collusion 
will be deterred only if expected rewards are less than expected costs, adjusted by the probability 
the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned. To undertake this analysis, we first calculated 
the expected rewards from cartelization using a new and unique database containing information 
concerning 75 cartel cases.50 We surveyed the literature to ascertain the probability that cartels 
are detected and that detected cartels are sanctioned. We calculated the size of the sanctions 
involved for each case in our sample. These included corporate fines, individual fines, payouts in 
private damage actions, and the equivalent value (or disvalue) of imprisonment or house arrest 
for the individuals convicted.51 
Our analysis showed that, overall, the combined U.S. cartel sanctions are only 9-21 
percent as large as they should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. This 
means that despite the existing sanctions, collusion remains a rational business strategy. 
Cartelization is a crime that, on average, pays. In fact, it pays very well. There is currently no 
cartel over-deterrence in the United States. Nor is the proposed Directive likely to cause over-
deterrence in Europe. 
I .  Many Private Cases Were Not Follow-ups to Government Lit igation 
Not all of the private actions brought in the United States were follow-ups to government 
enforcement. The Davis/Lande study, for example, found that more than one-third of the 60 
cases it studied were not follow-ups to government actions, and an additional 12 were 
significantly broader than the original government cases.52 $8.4-$10.2 billion was recovered from 
the cases that did not follow U.S. federal, U.S. state, or E.U. government enforcement actions. In 
these cases, private plaintiffs uncovered the violations, initiated, and pursued the litigation with 
the government following the private plaintiffs’ lead or playing no role at all. Another $11 billion 
came from cases with a mixed private/public origin or from cases that were significantly broader 
than the government's original case.53 
                                                      
48 In theory victims also can sue for the allocative inefficiency effects of market power or the "umbrella" effects 
of market power. In the United States there has never been an award for the allocative inefficiency effects of market 
power, and awards for the "umbrella effects" of market power are rare or non-existent. Id. at 457-62. Don't expect too 
many of these awards in European cases. 
49 We also incorporated a number of behavioral insights into our analysis, but they only changed our proposed 
remedies. Id., passim. 
50 Id. 
51 For example, we use $6 million as having approximately the equivalent deterrent effect of either a year in 
prison or a year of house arrest. Id. 
52 See Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 3, at 30. The private cases often were broader in terms of time 
or geography or included more defendants or alleged violations. They often involved more defendants than the 
government cases, more causes of action, and greater relief (in some instances the only relief).  
53 Id.  
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It is doubtful, however, that the proposed Directive will result in nearly as many private 
cases that are not follow-ups to government enforcement. In fact, because the European Union 
has very different discovery procedures,54 and allows neither opt-out class action cases nor 
contingent fee cases, the number of private actions that do not follow government enforcement 
may be rare. 
J. U.S. Victims Received Bil l ions of Dollars from Foreign Violators of U.S. 
Antitrust Law 
The final point might be called a "balance of payments" or a "fairness to Europeans" 
consideration. A study by Dr. Connor found that, since 1999, foreign violators of U.S. antitrust 
laws returned more than $13 billion to U.S. victims of foreign cartels and monopolies. Indeed, in 
just the 60 cases Professor Davis and I studied, at least $6-$8 billion was recovered from non-U.S. 
companies, including more than $3 billion in cases against members of the vitamins cartels.55 
These totals do not include recoveries of products, discounts, coupons, or the value of injunctive 
relief or legal precedent. 
For political and other purposes, it could be highly significant that a substantial portion of 
these recoveries came from foreign lawbreakers. Without private enforcement, these foreign 
actors could have preyed on participants in the U.S. economy while retaining almost all of their 
spoils. 
As you know, many E.U. law violators are from the United States or Asia. A vigorous 
European private enforcement system surely would return a considerable number of Euros to 
European consumers and corporations from U.S. and other foreign actors. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission's proposed Directive concerning the private enforcement of 
Competition Law certainly would be beneficial for victims of anticompetitive conduct because it 
would allow some of them to obtain some compensation. It does not, however, go nearly far 
enough. Primarily, because it does not allow opt-out class action cases or contingent fees, it will 
leave most victims uncompensated. 
It is certainly possible the proposed Directive has flaws and will result in some 
unintended or undesirable consequences. But today, there is a much greater flaw in E.U. 
competition law. Because of its lack of effective private enforcement, most victims are 
uncompensated. The injustice from not compensating these victims is more important than any 
injustices that might happen to companies that violate E.U. law. 
 If the proposed Directive is enacted, it should be assessed after it has been in effect for 3 
to 5 years. The U.S. experience suggests this examination will produce a number of important 
findings: (i) most of the private cases will be found to be meritorious; (ii) despite possible suits 
under Member State as well as E.U. law, and by both direct and indirect victims, most victims 
will still be uncompensated or undercompensated; (iii) deterrence of anticompetitive activity will 
                                                      
54 For an extensive discussion on these issues see Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo, supra note 24 
(comparing and contrasting the United States and European approaches in detail). 
55 See Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 3, at 17. 
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improve; and (iv) E.U. victims will recover a considerable number of Euros from non-E.U. 
violators. Further, the total amounts paid by violators in suits filed Europe-wide as a result of the 
new Directive, and also under the laws of individual European nations, by both direct and 
indirect purchasers, will rarely if ever exceed 100 percent of the actual damages. 
After this retrospective is complete, the Commission should consider ways to further 
improve its private enforcement system. Perhaps at that time, the European Union will 
reconsider allowing opt-out class action cases or contingent fees. If the Commission does 
reevaluate these issues, it should, of course, do so only on the basis of objective, reliable empirical 
information, and not on the basis of rumor, unsupported conventional wisdom, opinions, 
hypotheticals, or anecdotes. 
In the meantime, individual Member States are free to do more than the minimum, set 
out by the proposed Directive. This short article suggests only a few of the ways56 they could 
enact laws that are extremely likely to help victims of anticompetitive behavior. 
                                                      
56 As another possibility, the proposed directive contains a presumption that cartels overcharge, but the 
presumption does not specify an overcharge amount. See proposed directive, supra note 11, at 39. Perhaps a revised 
directive should contain a presumption that cartels overcharge by 10 percent, the amount specified by the United 
States sentencing commission in its antitrust guidelines. A more realistic alternative would be to adopt a 20 percent 
presumption, which would still be less than the typical amount of cartel overcharges found in a study I performed 
together with Professor Connor. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? 
Implications for Reform of the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines, 80 TULANE LAW. R.  513 (2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787907. 
This study identified about 200 serious social science studies of cartels, and these studies contained 674 
observations of average overcharges. Our primary finding is that the median cartel overcharge for all types of cartels 
over all time periods has been 25 percent; 17-19 percent for domestic U.S. cartels, and 30-33 percent for 
international cartels. Thus, in general, international cartels have been about 75 percent more effective in raising 
prices than domestic cartels. Since the United States has had, historically, by far the toughest system of anticartel 
sanctions, this could imply that these sanctions have been having significant effects. 
We also performed a survey of every final verdict we could find in decided U.S. collusion cases. Only 3 of the 25 
cases we found were international cartels. This survey produced an average median overcharge of 21.6 percent and 
an average mean overcharge of 30.0 percent. Thus, the 25 U.S. cartel decisions produced average overcharges that 
were quite comparable to the results of the much larger set of economic estimates. Id. 
